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Evolution in Perestroika Thinking
Gorbachev announced his intent in 1985 to introduce radical eco 
nomic reform to the Soviet Union. He deliberately used the term "radi 
cal" to differentiate this reform from the half-hearted reforms of the 
past. The perestroika process has been running for over five years and 
has yielded few positive results.
The reform thinking of the Soviet leadership has evolved through 
three phases, although, it must be noted, the third phase is still in its 
infancy. Moreover, no one knows whether the Soviet Union will ever 
embark seriously on this third stage.
The first phase of perestroika dates to its first three to four years. 
This phase was characterized by naive expectations. It was thought that 
with relatively minor tinkering, the Soviet planned economy could be 
revived. A simple reduction in bureaucratic meddling plus the massive 
Western assistance that would be attracted by political liberalization 
would allow the Soviet economy to accelerate (uskorenie).
The second phase began in the 1988-1989 period, when it was 
clearly realized that minor tinkering would not yield the desired 
results. At this point, the leadership concluded that reform must go 
beyond minor repairs and deal with substantive issues. During this 
phase, it was determined to weaken the bureaucracy's hold on the 
economy and to unleash more local initiative. Although it was realized
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that fundamental legal, economic, and social reforms in laws and prop 
erty rights were required, the argument was that these would take time, 
and that one must proceed with caution on introducing fundamental 
reform. However, it was felt that positive results would be achieved as 
a consequence of reducing the interventionary powers of the bureau 
cracy. During this phase, particular attention was devoted to the per 
ceived problems of macroeconomic stability. Fundamental reforms 
could not be introduced prior to the introduction of stabilizing mea 
sures.
The third phase, which remained in its infancy in early 1991, began 
with the realization that reform requires dealing with the fundamental 
long-range issues. Institutions must be created that support market-like 
resource allocation. Property rights, freedom of and protection of con 
tracts, and modern banking based upon commercial principles must be 
introduced. Although these issues have yet to be addressed concretely 
by official reform proposals, they are prominent in the reform packages 
put forward by the Yeltsin group—the 500-Day Program.
Issues of Bureaucratic Opposition
What exactly does the Soviet economic bureaucracy want from the 
reform process? What is the reform program of the bureaucracy? To a 
great extent, whether recognized or not, the interests of the bureau 
cracy have been reflected in the reform program of the Ryzhkov and 
Pavlov governments. The bureaucratic attitude towards reform can be 
characterized by the following propositions.
(1) The economy is not yet ready for markets for a variety of rea 
sons, the most prominent being macroeconomic imbalances.
(2) Reform is inevitably a slow process in which substantive 
reforms must be introduced gradually.
(3) The costs of rapid reform are too substantial. Reform must be 
introduced gradually to limit the social costs.
Why do bureaucrats oppose substantive economic reform? A num 
ber of reasons can be suggested, both valid and invalid.
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First, they realize that true economic reform means a loss of jobs 
and a reduction in authority and prestige. The reform discussion has 
already made them pariahs in their communities.
Second, economic reform is truly a power struggle, a struggle over 
who controls economic resources: Who will control diamonds, or oil, 
or building permits? These decisions determine who has the power in 
society.
Third, among the bureaucracy there is a sincere feeling that the 
economy will collapse without centralized directives. Planners and 
bureaucrats have an ingrained physical balance mentality that causes 
them to fear market allocation. They simply cannot perceive how it 
could work. To Soviet bureaucrats, "deficits" are inherent to the econ 
omy. They can only be removed by administrative measures, not by 
prices.
Although it is generally perceived that Soviet managers form the 
natural constituency for radical reform, this is far from the case. There 
is a true ambiguity of managerial attitudes towards reform. Experi 
enced managers have developed a comfort level with the old system. 
They understand that the transition period will be rocky. Moreover, the 
outcome of reform is by no means certain. Managers understand that a 
half-way reform would likely leave them worse off. Attitudes towards 
reform vary depending upon whether managers will have ready mar 
kets for their goods both at home and in the West after the marketiza- 
tion has taken place. It is noteworthy that the major organized 
opposition to reform from the ranks of managers has come from direc 
tors of heavy-industrial establishments.
Bureaucratic Excuses
Bureaucrats put forward a number of reasons for delaying substan 
tive reforms and continuing to rely on minor tinkering.
First, bureaucrats cite the specter of inflation. Because Soviet prices 
have for decades been kept at artificially low levels, especially retail
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pices, conversion to market resource allocation would mean substan 
tial increases in prices.
It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on fear of inflation in the 
Soviet Union. Lenin had described inflation as the instrument that can 
destroy capitalism, and this thinking has caused Soviet authorities to 
have a perhaps irrational fear of inflation, which is shared by the popu 
lation. Soviet bureaucrats and authorities confuse the income redistri 
bution effects of inflation with the inefficiency effects of inflation. It is 
clear that a move to clearing prices will have strong income redistribut 
ing effects, and that measures to protect those on fixed incomes must 
be put in place. The move to clearing prices, as long as it does not lead 
to hyperinflation, however, should have a positive effect on efficiency. 
People and managers will, for the first time, make resource allocation 
decisions based on relative scarcities. Economic theory has taught that 
moderate inflation, if properly anticipated, does not affect real output 
and hence efficiency.
Second, Soviet bureaucrats use the specter of monopoly as an 
excuse for not moving into the third phase of reform. The administra 
tive-command economy has, over the years, created a highly concen 
trated industrial structure with individual suppliers having significant 
market power. Bureaucrats argue that one cannot use market allocation 
with such high levels of concentration. Planners must use their control 
of investment decisions to create a system of alternate suppliers before 
moving to market allocation.
The process of creating alternate suppliers will be, at best, slow and 
gradual. Moreover, it seems unrealistic to rely on the planning struc 
ture—which created the monopoly problem in the first place—to cre 
ate an optimal industrial structure. Bureaucrats do not understand the 
notion that free entry under conditions of market allocation is a more 
reliable way to resolve the monopoly problem even though they recog 
nize that state pricing rules can be used to limit monopoly profits dur 
ing the transition period.
Third, Soviet bureaucrats contend that opening the Soviet economy 
will have disastrous consequences unless foreign transactions remain 
under the center's strict control. Such concerns are not unusual in a
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country with limited foreign exchange earnings and growing hard cur 
rency debt. Other bureaucratic concerns about opening the economy 
are less standard. Soviet foreign trade bureaucrats believe that only 
"rich" economies can gain from trade. If the Soviet economy enters the 
international trade arena as a "poor" economy, it will prove uncompet- 
itive. This type of thinking ignores the fact that comparative advantage 
allows both rich and poor countries to benefit from trade, if they spe 
cialize according to comparative advantage. The corollary of this 
thinking is the belief that the Soviet economy must first become 
"wealthy" before it can effectively trade with the West. Insofar as this 
"wealth" is a long way off, liberalizing foreign trade must be delayed.
Another nonstandard reason for delaying trade liberalization is the 
fear that valuable Soviet resources will be lost. Given the distorted 
domestic pricing system, unscrupulous Westerners will take advantage 
of pricing "mistakes" in both Soviet products and assets. These pricing 
mistakes will allow the Western world to acquire Soviet products and 
assets at unreasonably low prices.
The fear of Western exploitation reflects bureaucratic attitudes 
towards pricing. The Soviet bureaucrat views prices as instruments to 
be controlled by higher authority; under this system, prices do not 
change frequently. Even if pricing officials see that particular Soviet 
products and assets are being bought by Westerners at alarming rates, 
they would not be able to use these pricing signals quickly enough to 
raise prices to prevent the exploitation from taking place. Rather than 
viewing Western purchases as a means of obtaining valuable informa 
tion on scarcity prices, Soviet pricing officials view Western purchases 
as a destabilizing threat. Similar fears, for example, prompted high 
Soviet officials in early 1991 to warn of Western banking conspiracies 
aimed to buying valuable Soviet products and assets at bargain-base 
ment prices.
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Chaos and the Command Economy
There has been a substantial dismantling of the Soviet economic 
bureaucracy. Staff cuts in Moscow bureaucratic organizations have 
averaged 30 percent; the industrial ministries—organizations that pro 
vided the glue that held the command system together—have been 
hard hit Industrial enterprises no longer answer to the local party sec 
retary. It is unclear who can make and enforce decisions in today's 
Soviet economy. The balance of power has begun to shift towards the 
enterprise and away from the state committees, industrial ministries, 
and local party officials. Enterprises no longer automatically fulfill 
directives from above.
Restrictions of enterprise autonomy remain most prominent in those 
areas most essential to marketization of the Soviet economy. Enter 
prises still are not free to set their own prices, acquire their own sup 
plies, and complete deals with Western companies. Pricing officials 
continue to insist on cost-based pricing formulae that do not reflect 
demand and that "protect" the public from excess profits. Industrial 
managers must sell deficit products at state-dictated prices that often 
provide little or no profit. Few Soviet bureaucrats want wholesale trade 
to replace centralized distribution, even though this is a declared goal 
of perestroika. In fact, most feel that wholesale trade would worsen 
rather than help the troubled material-technical supply system, which 
remains the weakest point in the Soviet system.
What reform package would Soviet economic bureaucrats be will 
ing to support? They would like to see an economic system in which 
roughly half of enterprise output is dictated by state orders. The cen 
tralized supply system would be retained, with enterprises allowed to 
deal only at the margin in products produced above quotas. Less than 
one-quarter of Moscow bureaucrats favor giving enterprises freedom 
to set their own prices. The bureaucratic "reform" package falls far 
short even of the modest official proposals of the late 1980s. The ste 
reotype of bureaucratic opposition to radical reform is accurate. In a 
society that has traditionally rewarded bureaucrats for agreeing with 
the official line ("perestroika will be a success"), it is remarkable that
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less than half of Moscow bureaucrats feel that perestroika will eventu 
ally be successful.
The clear-cut identification of enterprise managers as the major ben 
eficiaries of reform conceals an interesting ambiguity. Managers fear a 
move away from key features of the old system. The enterprise manag 
er's fear of the unknown is understandable. In a chaotic system that 
mixes command and market elements, that assigns arbitrary prices, 
taxes away excess profits, and fails to assign clear property rights, who 
can predict whether the experienced manager's lot will be improved? 
Soviet managers would obviously prefer a well-functioning market 
system if presented a choice. Enough of them have seen it at work in 
Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Managerial support for 
the more comfortable aspects of the old system reflects the lack of faith 
in the ability of the Soviet leadership to devise a nonchaotic system 
that combines market and plan.
Neither the Soviet bureaucrat nor the enterprise manager appears to 
understand how a market economy works. Sixty years of command 
system have taught both groups to think in terms of administrative bal 
ancing of supplies and demand. Goods are inherently in deficit. Short 
ages can only be eliminated by producing more. Raising the price has 
nothing to do with the "deficitness" of the commodity. Soviet bureau 
crats believe in the visible hand of administrative methods. They 
openly worry about where the wheat, steel, shoes, and cigarettes will 
come from if they are not planned from above. In addition to personal 
concerns for their jobs and livelihood, Soviet bureaucrats are con 
vinced that the economy could not continue to function in an orderly 
manner without them.
The limited economic reform that has taken place appears to have 
made things worse, as evidenced by declining growth, supply crises, 
hoarding, strikes, and rising inflation. The explanation is quite simple: 
Perestroika has dismantled much of the Soviet command system prior 
to establishing a new market order. The chaos associated with the ero 
sion of the planned order threatens public and official support for radi 
cal reform. The Soviet public and the Soviet leadership may associate 
chaos with market reform rather than with the collapse of the com-
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mand system. Moreover, the fear of the chaos inherent in a partial 
reform, could deprive the reform movement of its natural constituents, 
the industrial managers.
Can "command" be restored to an economy that has experienced the 
first steps of decentralization? Both enterprise managers and Moscow 
bureaucrats agree that local party influence over the economy has 
largely disappeared. They agree that the influence of industrial minis 
tries and state committees has fallen considerably. Managers now pick 
and choose the directives they are prepared to implement. Ad hoc deci- 
sionmaking has replaced the old rules and regulations of the adminis 
trative-command economy.
We return to the issue of the optimal phasing of reform. The phasing 
chosen by the Soviet leadership has, obviously, not been successful. 
The Soviet leadership has chosen, as a first step, to dismantle signifi 
cant elements of the command apparatus (most particularly the minis 
try command system) and to give enterprises new but restricted 
freedoms. Moreover, the local party command element has largely dis 
appeared. The glue that once held the command system together has 
disappeared, and a new form of glue has yet to be put in place— 
namely, the discipline of the market.
The Soviet economy finds itself lacking disciplinary forces, either 
from the side of command or from the side of markets. The monetary 
control system that was previously based upon strict governmental and 
political control of monetary emissions has dissipated into an ineffec 
tive system designed to win political allies. Strict wage increase formu 
lae (wages should not increase more rapidly than productivity) have 
been laid aside. Enterprises, with strengthened workers' collectives 
now set their own wage increases, still without a hard budget con 
straint. The central budget is in chaos because of the failure to resolve 
center-republic relations, and budget deficits must be covered by print 
ing money. Strikes represent a thorny problem because market forces 
are not providing information on which wage requests to grant and 
which to deny.
These events cause one to question whether a cautious, phased 
reform will work. Moreover, it threatens loss of political support for
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reform. The "cold turkey" approach, judging by the Polish experience, 
causes substantial output declines and a substantial upward movement 
in prices in the reform's first phase. However, under the cold turkey 
approach, the eventual benefits should be felt in the relatively near 
future. This sense may allow public support for reform to endure the 
difficult first phase. Under the Soviet gradualist approach, a slow hem 
orrhage becomes a faster hemorrhage, and there is no end in sight to 
the problem. To expect public support for reform to continue in this 
environment is unrealistic.
